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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impacts of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) on wages of 
workers for the period 1993-2007. The results suggest a positive effect of M&A on wages; 
however, for workers that have participated in M&A in an acquired bank, it seems that M&A 
has a detrimental impact reflected by a reduction of the positive effect. We have also observed 
that the effects of acquisitions differ over time indicating that time dimension is an important 
element to consider, as the positive effect is not so manifest in the second year after the M&A; 
moreover we observe that the positive effect decreases even more in the third year after the 
M&A. The research also tries to assess if the effects differ according to the M&A type and the 
worker qualification level. Empirical results show that for highly qualified workers, M&A seems 
to be positive for wages. M&A may also produce different effects on employees’ wages 
according to the type of operation. Domestic acquisitions tend to have a positive effect on 
wages, but when analysing the impact on workers of foreign acquisitions, the results show a 
negative effect. 
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1. Introduction 
Until the mid-1980s, the Portuguese banking sector was publicly owned and limited by strong 
administrative and legal controls. In the following years several factors contributed towards the 
development of this sector. The liberalization and the deregulation in the banking sector together with 
globalization and technological development have created a new competitive environment. The 
harmonization of the prudential regulation implemented during the first half of the nineties and the 
creation in 1993 of the Single European Market for financial services were important determinants of 
the liberalization process1. As a result, the integration of financial markets has blurred the distinction 
between activities such as lending, investment banking, asset management and insurance. All these 
transformations have created threats and opportunities, and banks have reacted to the increasing 
competition by cutting costs and expanding in size, often by merging with competitors or taking them 
over.  
The Portuguese case is an interesting subject of investigation as it has undergone, since 1990, 
an accelerating consolidation process, representing an interesting opportunity to investigate the effects 
of M&A on wages. For Portugal, research focusing on the banking labour market is scarce and, to our 
knowledge, the only study that presents evidence regarding the Portuguese banking industry was 
presented by Monteiro (2004, 2010) who assessed the impact of privatisation on wages. Additionally, 
a comprehensive dataset covering this period is available so it is possible to assess the impact of M&A 
operations on individuals whose firms where subject to ownership changes. The use of matched 
employer-employee data allows us to access detailed information on individuals and in doing so it is 
possible to control for differences at the worker level and to control for changes in the composition of 
the workforce. 
The literature on employment and wage effects of M&A is mostly concentrated at the plant and 
firm level (Conyon et al., 2002a; Conyon et al., 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004; Lehto and 
Böckerman, 2008; McGucking and Nguyen, 2001; Oberhofer, 2013), so it is not possible to assess 
the effects of these operations on an individual worker. Using individual workers’ wages rather than 
plant or firm wages will allow us to deal with individual heterogeneity. Thus, this study contributes by 
analysing the effects of M&A at the individual level, considering the relationship between ownership 
changes and workers. In this context, the aim of this study is to assess the impacts of M&A on the 
                                                 
1 The Second Banking Directive (89/646/CEE, of 15 December 1989) has been transposed into Portuguese legislation by the Decree-Law 298/92, of 
31 December, which established the RGICSF (Regime Geral das Instituições de Crédito e Sociedades Financeiras). 
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labour market for workers of acquired firms, including unobservable firm and individual characteristics 
by using the fixed effects least squares dummy variables regression as proposed by Andrews et al. 
(2006) and the spell fixed effects approach implemented by Graham et al. (2012) in their study on 
managerial attributes and executive compensation. 
The impacts of M&A may not happen immediately, so this investigation also takes into account 
the time dimension and it examines the effect of M&A on wages in different years after the M&A. The 
longitudinal nature of our dataset enables us to analyse the impact of M&A on employees and to 
consider the time dimension of those effects. 
This research also tries to assess if the effects on wages differ according to the worker’s 
qualification level and the type of M&A2. Regarding the definition of M&A we have adopted an all-
embracing concept of M&A according to what matters, which is the existence of a common strategy 
to be implemented in the firms that are integrated. In this sense, patrimony depends on a unique 
economic centre, so we are concerned with the integration event no matter which form of integration 
it assumes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the literature 
that has examined the relationship between M&A, employment and wages. The following section 
focuses on the data and the description of the sample and it also contains the descriptive statistics for 
some of the variables used. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and the corresponding 
results are reported in Section 5. Finally, the main conclusions are outlined in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Efficiency, employment and wages 
The perception that M&A have negative effects on the labour market has been an interesting subject 
of investigation in recent years. The recognition of the M&A’s efficiency gains related to increased 
productivity and reduced costs has put into question the relation between efficiency, employment and 
wages reduction. According to Jensen (1988), ownership changes result in organizational restructuring 
involving plant closings, layoffs of top-level and mid-level managers, staff and production workers and 
reduced compensation. 
                                                 
2 We classify M&A as being domestic or foreign. To classify a bank as a foreign entity we consider in our analysis a 50% threshold of foreign participation. 
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In this sense, labour market impacts are crucial, since the workforce adjustments are determinant 
in achieving M&A gains, therefore the efficiency motive represents one of the most important 
motivations for the pursuance of these operations, so in synergy-promoting M&A we can expect that 
the firms involved may wish to rationalize and use their assets jointly to obtain scale economies. It is 
expected that the rationalization will include human capital, and the downsizing of overlapping 
activities certainly will include a reduction in the workforce (McGucking and Nguyen, 2001; Lehto and 
Böckerman, 2008). However, it may not be just the case that merging firms exploit short-run 
economies of scale, by reducing overall employment in the new entity; it may also be observed that 
efficiency gains would permit the newly combined entity to grow, which would increase labour demand, 
leading to an employment increase. 
In the analysis of the effect of M&A on the labour market, several studies focus their attention on 
the changes in employment and/or in wages within a given time period. At the firm-level, the effects 
of M&A are obtained for the average plant or firm level worker. Even controlling for firm or plant-level 
human capital, these studies may not capture the effects on individual workers. The mixed results on 
the employment effects give an indication of the employment effects; however, they are uncertain 
concerning the nature of the labour market effects (Pendleton, 2016). 
 
2.1.1. Firm-level evidence 
Oberhofer (2013) confirms the evidence of a positive and significant impact of acquisitions on 
employment of acquired firms. His study examines the post-acquisition employment growth of 
acquired firms and concludes that targets of acquisition increase their employment growth rate after 
the operation which, according to the author, provides evidence for the existence of efficiency gains.  
Several studies report negative employment effects of M&A. More precisely, Conyon et al. (2002a) 
report that UK mergers result in a reduction in wages and compensation for non-production workers 
and it has also found a reduction in employment on related mergers in comparison to non-related 
mergers. In a previous study, Conyon et al. (2001) consider the hypothesis that hostile takeovers 
constitute a disciplinary mechanism that will increase productivity and employment reduction and an 
opportunity to renege on implicit contracts that will increase job losses. They analyse the employment 
effects of hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom for the 1993-1996 period and they observe that 
hostile and friendly acquisitions are associated with a decrease in labour demand, therefore there is 
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no difference between these two types of transactions. Indeed, both types of acquisitions have an 
immediate negative effect on employment. 
The hypothesis that mergers may serve as a mechanism of restructuring is also considered by 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) in their study on employment effects for US and European mergers, they 
consider that M&A represent a general device to restore a firm’s optimal employment level. Comparing 
USA and Europe, the authors find that there is a decline in employment for mergers involving European 
firms. Since Europe has more rigid labour markets, mergers constitute an effective mechanism to 
reduce excess labour. M&A, as suggested by Shleifer and Summers (1988), may constitute a 
mechanism to renege on implicit contracts, laying off workers or reducing their wages; in the case of 
rigid labour markets, they also serve as a means to renegotiate the existing labour contracts. This 
restructuring mechanism constitutes an important reason for the reduction of employment (Lehto and 
Böckerman, 2008; Kubo and Saito, 2012).  
In their study regarding the changes in employment and wages after a merger in Japan, Kubo 
and Saito (2012) find a reduction in the number of employees that occurs three years following the 
operation. A possible explanation for this suggests that firms try to reduce employment by suspending 
the recruitment of new employees, or by asking for voluntary retirement. In this sense, firms try to 
avoid the dismissal of employees. They also find that this negative effect on employment is more 
pronounced for related and non-rescue mergers. When analysing the employment conditions of those 
that remain in the firm, they observe a wage increase and conclude that employment conditions 
improve after a merger, namely for related and non-rescue mergers. Kuvandikov et al. (2014) however, 
consider that for related transactions, the expected reduction in employment is not always observed. 
This indicates that M&A are not always bad for the labour market, thus considering that it is important 
to distinguish between job transfer and job loss. 
In line with these ideas, notwithstanding that in some cases ownership changes may be less 
positive for workers, it may be the case that in larger plants where the managerial discipline hypothesis 
is more valid, the reduction in employment may have benefits as ownership changes improve 
efficiency that countervail the losses for many workers (McGucking and Nguyen, 2001). The same 
point of view is also shared by Amess et al. (2014), according to whom, for related acquisitions, a 
wage increase is expected as a result of efficiency gains. This increase in wages will result from low 
productivity workers losing their jobs after takeovers and a higher average productivity and wages for 
the remaining workers is observed. 
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Ownership changes may not just be an opportunity to renege on implicit contracts, but they have 
other consequences on wages as long as they affect the structure of the product market and influence 
wages through profits and bargaining positions (Conyon et al., 2004). The authors observe that 
profitability and wages increase following an acquisition and that the type of transaction is important. 
In this sense, workers will obtain larger wage increases if they are involved in related mergers and the 
increase in wages results not just from an improved bargaining position, but also from the increase in 
profitability, suggesting that there is an increase in labour efficiency.  
2.1.2. Evidence from linked employer-employee data 
Empirical studies that have made use of matched employer-employee data focus their analysis at the 
individual level. According to Siegel (2008), M&A transactions increase additional investment in human 
capital and promote quality improvement for workers that remain in the same firm. For Swedish 
manufacturing plants, the authors find that employment is reduced after ownership change. However, 
this effect occurs most strongly for full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions. The 
findings suggest that M&A are associated with a decline in earnings. However, when analysing different 
types of transactions, the findings also suggest that earnings decline more in the case of workers who 
worked at a plant that was acquired by an owner that did not previously own an establishment. For 
partial investitures, the authors observe an increase in earnings. Thus, human capital is valued 
differently according to the type of transaction and those who acquire just a part of the firm or those 
who enter into a new industry by a purchase mechanism, value more the existing stock of human 
capital. 
The positive effect on earnings and in the quality of human capital is also observed in a 
subsequent study (Siegel et al., 2009), which suggests that plants involved in an ownership change 
present an improvement in terms of average employee age, experience and percentage of workers 
with a college degree. At the individual level, it seems that job losses for women and non-Swedish 
workers occur with ownership changes, however higher turnover rates are observed for the same type 
of workers that were not subject to ownership changes. The authors observe that highly educated 
workers appear to be more mobile, and women, foreign-born and younger workers employed at plants 
involved in ownership changes experience higher job losses and reductions in wages. 
Siegel and Simons (2010) find, by using linked employer-employee data for virtually all Swedish 
manufacturing firms and employees and consistent with human capital theory, that M&A enhance 
plant productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and firms. 
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Furthermore, they observe that M&A have a positive effect on workers’ careers by improving the sorting 
and matching of workers and managers to firms and industries that are best suited to their skills. In 
spite of the reduction of establishments and firms, the plants involved in M&A operations were subject 
to a quality improvement of their employees. 
This line of reasoning is in accordance with Smeets et al. (2016) in their study on post-merger 
organizational integration, pointing out the importance of human capital, as well as knowledge sharing 
in M&A. In this sense, even if M&A may result in a negative experience for many employees, highly 
skilled workers will still benefit. Thus, workers with less firm-specific human capital, education and 
tenure will probably be more prone to leave the merged firm.  
 
2.2. Foreign ownership, employment and wages 
2.2.1. Firm-level evidence 
As cross-border M&A have increased substantially worldwide, the relationship between foreign 
ownership and wages has also been a topic of investigation. In their study about the impact of foreign 
ownership on firm level productivity and wages in the UK manufacturing industry for the 1989-1994 
period, Conyon et al. (2002b) find that domestic acquisitions, namely horizontal acquisitions, are 
accompanied by a reduction in wages that are explained by the opportunity that acquisitions offer to 
renege on implicit labour contracts and to transfer surplus from the workforce.  When they compare 
foreign to domestic acquisitions, they observe an increase in average wages after a foreign acquisition.  
The positive effect of foreign takeovers on wages may be explained by the possession and transfer 
of a firm specific asset that enhances productivity and profitability for these firms. If foreign firms are 
more productive and if the efficient use of the firm specific asset requires productive workers, then we 
may observe higher wages after the transfer of the firm specific asset to the target firm. It may also 
occur that foreign firms offer non-competitive wages that increase productivity and profitability in order 
to reduce labour turnover, motivate employees, enhance loyalty and select highly skilled workers 
(Girma and Görg, 2007; Bandick, 2011). This line of reasoning is also present in Oldford and Otchere 
(2016) in a sense that not only will higher productivity generate higher wages, but also higher wages 
may be paid to the remaining employees in order to achieve increased productivity. 
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 Another explanation is that the change in ownership may alter the industrial relations practices, 
so these changes may have effects on wages. We may observe that the wage level in the foreign 
affiliate is linked to the parent company, or that foreign firms pay higher wages than domestic firms 
in order to avoid industrial relations disputes. Moreover, the authors consider that higher wages may 
also be expected when successful work practices or new arrangements are transferred to foreign 
subsidiaries. Thus, to implement these practices or arrangements effectively, workers are 
compensated with higher wages. 
In order to identify the causal effect of foreign acquisitions on wages, Girma and Görg (2007) 
investigate the impact on wages of the takeover of a domestic establishment by foreign owners and 
observe that the post-acquisition wage effect depends on the nationality of the foreign acquirer and 
the skill group of workers. They find a wage increase, on average, for skilled and unskilled workers for 
US firms. However, these effects are not observable in the case of EU firms.  
Huttunen (2007) shares the same ideas as Girma and Görg (2007) in terms of the theoretical 
explanations for higher wages paid by foreign-owned firms, nonetheless the author points out that 
these firms employ qualified workers in comparison to domestic firms, thus this represents a 
reasonable explanation for a wage premium. In her study on the effect of foreign acquisition on wages 
in Finland, she finds that foreign acquisition has a positive effect on wages for all skill groups; however, 
the effect becomes more evident as the level of schooling increases. She also observes that the effect 
is not immediate and it is observed within 1 to 3 years after the acquisition. According to the author, 
this delay may be due to several reasons, for instance foreign firms implement more training, thus 
wages in plants acquired by foreign-owned firms increase only some years after the acquisition and 
the increase in wages is higher for highly educated workers. Another reason is related to some 
organizational changes that may occur in the firm that require time to be implemented. It may also 
occur that changes in average wages result from changes in the employment composition of the 
workforce, which creates adjustment costs, therefore the changes are not immediate. Finally, the 
author also considers that measurement problems may create uncertainty about the right time for the 
acquisition. 
2.2.2. Evidence from linked employer-employee data 
It is, however, not clear if the increase in wages after a foreign acquisition is due to worker reallocation 
and changes in the firm´s human capital or due to increases in labour productivity and this is 
explained by the difficulty in obtaining information about firms and workers over time (Almeida, 2007). 
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Aiming at analysing the foreign wage premium that is documented by the literature, the author is also 
interested in the effects of acquisitions on labour reallocation, as ownership changes are associated 
with the reallocation of resources to efficient uses. 
The results show that foreign acquisitions have small effects on human capital and on average 
wages of the acquired firms. Thus, foreign ownership does not improve the labour market outcomes, 
as foreign ownership may be motivated by some unobservable characteristics as education and wages. 
The differences between foreign and domestic firms result from a selection effect, thus foreign firms 
select domestic firms to acquire that have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages.  
In line with these ideas, Heyman et al. (2007) observe a small foreign wage premium. Their 
comparison of foreign-owned firms with domestic firms for the Swedish private sector suggests that 
foreign takeovers have no positive effect on wages. When analysing at the individual level the foreign 
ownership premium disappears, thus, according to the authors, firm level analysis tends to 
overestimate the foreign wage premium, so for an individual worker we can expect that a foreign 
acquisition will result in a reduction of wage growth. Similar conclusions for Portugal are obtained by 
Martins (2004) who considers that the overestimation of the commonly documented wage premium 
is due to the lack of a good comparison between domestic and foreign firms; and to the workers’ 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
Martins and Esteves (2008) in their study about the Brazilian labour market find that both types 
of acquisitions (domestic to foreign or vice versa) do not tend to affect wages significantly. When 
considering the wage implications of worker mobility, they also find that there are different impacts 
according to the type of acquisition, thus movers from foreign to domestic firms suffer larger wage 
cuts, and movers from domestic to foreign firms observe lower wage cuts or an increase in their pay.  
In another study, Heyman et al. (2011) examine the impact of cross-border acquisitions on intra-
firm wage dispersion for Swedish firms. Their results show that multinational operations do not affect 
wage dispersion, but it is the acquisition itself that affects wage dispersion. They also find that the 
positive effects are mostly concentrated on managers, namely CEOs, and that wages for other high-
skilled workers are not affected. For medium and low skilled workers, they observe a negative effect 
of acquisition on wages, so there is an increase in wage dispersion. 
Both Girma and Gorg (2007) and Heyman et al. (2011) assume that skilled labour is important 
and a scarce production factor, since skills are required to implement the transformations of the 
acquisition process. Therefore, wages will increase for high-skilled workers and remain constant for 
other types of workers. The authors also assume that the bargaining process associated with foreign 
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ownership may contribute to wage dispersion, as skilled workers will be in a better position than 
unskilled workers. 
In spite of the recognition of the wage differentials between foreign and domestically-owned firms 
and the existence of a foreign wage premium, it is not very evident if foreign firms pay higher wages 
to identical workers, thus it is important to change the unit of observation from the firm or plant level 
to the individual level. (Heyman et al., 2007; Oberhofer et al., 2012; Hijzen et al., 2013).  Furthermore, 
Hijzen et al. (2013) observe that, at least in developed countries, foreign takeovers have a small 
positive effect or even a negative effect on individual wages. They present a cross-country study that 
includes Portugal and analyse the effects of foreign ownership on wages, employment and worker 
turnover rates. They find that, notwithstanding the overestimation of the foreign wage premium, there 
is a positive wage effect of foreign takeovers and that the wage effects associated with worker 
movements from domestic to foreign firms are also important. 
3. Data 
The analysis draws on a large matched employer-employee dataset known as Quadros de Pessoal. 
This is an annual compulsory survey run by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security that 
collects information on all firms located in Portugal with wage-earners. Records are available at the 
firm and plant level as well as at the worker level. The firm variable includes information on location, 
industry, sales, legal setting, year of constitution, share of the firm’s equity owned by foreign parties, 
number of establishments and number of employees. At the establishment level it comprises 
information on location, industry and number of workers, among others. The set of workers’ 
characteristics includes age, education, tenure, wages, hours worked and occupation. 
To assess the impacts of ownership change on workers, we have used longitudinal data on firms 
and their employees from 1985 to 20073. The dataset is restricted to 2007 as the Financial Crisis 
took place in 2008. The existence of unique (time-invariant) identifiers allows for matching firms and 
workers in each year and it also allows us to follow them over time, so it is possible to identify the 
banking entities and the workers of those firms. 
                                                 
3 Data on workers is not available for 1990 and 2001. 
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The entities in our sample were restricted to those operating in “other monetary intermediation” 
(code 65120), according to the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities – CAE–rev 2.1 (1995 
version) and they include all monetary institutions, excluding the Central Bank4.  
After de creation of the main dataset it was important to identify all domestic acquisitions. The 
identification of domestic acquisitions is possible through the use of data collected on an annual basis 
by the Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) in their Boletins Informativos. This dataset contains 
information on all banks in Portugal and reports the changes that took place in the banking sector. 
Besides accounting information, the dataset also reveals information on the firm (such as age, 
ownership, size, number of employees and branches and localization) and on employees’ 
characteristics (qualifications, type of activity and occupation in each bank). Another important fact is 
that, every year, the Boletim Informativo presents a synthesis of the evolution in the banking sector in 
comparison to the previous year, mentioning which banks entered or exited the banking sector or 
which ones were involved in the process of M&A, so it allows us to find those entities in the Quadros 
de Pessoal, by matching some information with that obtained from the APB. We have also identified 
all the entities that were not engaged in those processes. Table 1 highlights the major transformations 
occurred in the banking sector of the banks listed in the Boletins Informativos, between 1993 and 
20065. The remaining banks that were not subject to M&A transformations are displayed in the 
Appendix A.2. (Table A.2). 
The Boletins Informativos present information on share capital (capital social) as well as Quadros 
de Pessoal, thus it was possible to match the information and identify the entities. The information 
provided by the APB is only available from 1993 onwards, so it was possible to compare the evolution 
of this variable in Quadros de Pessoal and in the Boletins Informativos throughout the period under 
analysis. The existing information allowed the bank’s identification and, in the cases where the 
comparison was uncertain, a third source of information was used. The information contained in the 
“Information Disclosure System” of the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) was 
valuable, since it was possible to find information on the registries of the entities and institutions 
completed since the second quarter of the year 2000. In a few cases it was necessary to use this 
source of information. 
 
                                                 
4 Three revisions of the CAE have occurred between 1985 and 2007. The methodology for CAE uniformization and the entities included on “other 
monetary intermediation” are described in Appendix A.1. (Table A.1.1 and Table A.1.2). 
5 The year 2007 was not considered as no important transformations for our analysis were reported in that year. 
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Table 1: Major banking transformations 
Credit institution Period 
Acquisition of Banco Fonsecas & Burnay by Banco Português de Investimento. 1991 
Acquisition of Banco Português do Atlântico by Banco Comercial Português. 1995 
Acquisition of Banco Fomento do Exterior and Banco Borges & Irmão by Banco Português de 
Investimento. 
1996 
Merger of Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, Banco Fomento do Exterior, Banco Borges & Irmão and 
Banco Universo into Banco BPI. 
1998 
Merger of Banco Argentaria into Banco Bilbao Viscaya. 2000 
Merger of Banco Nacional Ultramarino into Caixa Geral de Depósitos. 2001 
Merger of Banco Mello, Banco Mello Imobiliário and Banco Português do Atlântico into Banco 
Comercial Português. 
2001 
Merger of Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor into Banco Comercial Português. 2001 
Merger of Credit Lyonnais Portugal into Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria 2001 
Acquisition of Banco Nacional de Crédito by Banco Popular Español. 2003 
Merger of Banco Expresso Atlântico and Credibanco into Banco Comercial Português. 2004 
Merger of Banco Totta & Açores and Banco Santander Portugal into Crédito Predial Português. 2004 
Merger of Banco Internacional de Crédito into Banco Espírito Santo. 2005 
Source: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. 
Note: For every firm subject to a M&A, information on variables like share capital, number of employees and branches and 
localization were collected. This data allowed us to find those entities in Quadros de Pessoal by matching some information 
with that obtained from the APB. Share capital was used as the primary matching variable due to its precise nature. 
In our final dataset we identify almost all the entities that are listed in Table 1 and Table A.2. The 
merged dataset with 914 754 observations contained all the banks, including those that only appear 
in the Quadros de Pessoal dataset and those that only appear in the APB dataset. It was possible to 
identify through the matching process almost 85% of the entities, representing 774 575 worker-year 
observations. 
After checking and clearing for inconsistencies, we only kept one observation per worker in each 
year, which resulted in an unbalanced panel with 747 921 observations (workers/years) and a total 
of 118 194 workers. Table 2 presents information on the number of banks and the number of bank 
employees from 1993 until 2007 for the acquirer and acquired entities and for all entities, including 
those not involved in M&A. 
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Table 2: Balance of the Panel (1993 – 2007) 
Year 
All Acquirers Acquired 
Banks Workers Banks Workers Banks Workers 
1993 35 49 205 4 10 943 16 34 469 
1994 39 58 812 6 21 937 16 32 361 
1995 40 60 094 6 22 720 16 32 089 
1996 40 60 056 6 22 648 16 31 947 
1997 40 56 037 4 20 441 15 29 538 
1998 38 54 953 5 20 159 14 28 295 
1999 41 56 091 5 21 171 14 28 020 
2000 40 54 047 6 24 584 10 21 615 
2001 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2002 40 50 013 7 27 618 7 13 509 
2003 40 48 767 7 32 897 6 6 813 
2004 39 48 306 7 32 579 5 6 314 
2005 36 48 194 6 36 235 2 1 901 
2006 33 50 703 6 38 594 1 1 143 
2007 33 52 643 6 39 663 1 1 183 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007 
Notes: The number of acquired and acquirer banks and their respective number of employees are reported for the entire 
period (1993-2007) and do not correspond to the number of acquisitions in each year. For example, in 1993 we identify 
16 banks that participated in M&A, however the acquisitions have occurred throughout the period of analysis; in the same 
way we observe that in the same year, 4 banks were identified as acquirers. The reduction of acquired banks can be 
explained by the integration processes that occurred after the M&A process, in which some banks were integrated into 
other banks. 
 
The banks were categorized according to their participation or not in M&A processes. The 
workforce engaged in these processes represents, approximately, 86% of our sample against 14% that 
correspond to those that did not participate in M&A. 
Table 3 provides information on the characteristics of employees from acquirer, acquired firms 
and non-merging firms. In terms of size, acquirer firms are larger. Non-merging firms present 
significant differences in terms of size and compensation. In fact, they are smaller and pay more to 
their employees. They also have younger and more educated workers when compared to merging 
firms. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for acquirer, acquired and non-merging firms 
Variable 
M&A 
Not M&A 
Acquirer Acquired 
Number of establishments    
Mean 413.0 152.4 32.7 
Std. Dev. 298.5 123.3 61.78 
Firm employees    
Mean 4733.0 2307.0 362.8 
Std. Dev. 3778.0 1899.0 587.7 
Monthly wage (real)    
Mean (euro) 836.0 785.7 1201.0 
Std. Dev. 39.88 99.21 465.0 
Total compensation (real)    
Mean (euro) 1307.0 1195.0 1607.0 
Std. Dev. 160.0 175.8 521.3 
Schooling (years)    
Mean 13.0 11.7 13.8 
Std. Dev. 1.1 1.3 1.4 
Age    
Mean 37.2 39.2 35.3 
Std. Dev. 4.1 4.9 3.1 
Tenure (years)    
Mean 9.8 11.3 5.4 
Std. Dev. 4.8 6.5 3.6 
Banks 8 16 27 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007 
Notes: (1) Monthly wage corresponds to base salary and it is measured in real terms (base year = 1993); 
Total compensation is measured as the monthly wage plus other remunerations received on a regular and 
irregular basis, in real terms (base year = 1993). (2) Statistics are reported according to the categorization of 
banks in terms of participation or not in M&A processes for the entire period (1993-2007) and do not rely on 
the year of acquisition.   
 
The distribution of the sample by levels of education is presented in Table 4. In a more detailed 
analysis, we can observe that the highest levels of education are found in non-merging firms, but when 
comparing acquirers with acquired firms the first present a more educated workforce. Table 4 also 
presents information on qualifications and suggests that non-merging firms in comparison to merging 
firms have more “top executives”, however, merging firms, namely acquirers, are superior in terms of 
“intermediary executives”, “supervisors” and “highly skilled workers”. 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Table 4: Panel characteristics by education and qualification levels (workers from acquirers, acquired and 
non-merging firms) 
Variable 
M&A Not M&A All 
Acquirer Acquired   
Education Level     
Less than primary school 0.02% 0.36% 0.11% 0.15% 
Primary school 1.59% 4.60% 1.89% 2.72% 
Preparatory school 5.41% 7.84% 1.64% 5.75% 
Lower secondary school 19.46% 31.60% 14.13% 23.07% 
Secondary school 45.41% 36.89% 46.14% 42.44% 
Upper secondary school 3.92% 2.96% 4.90% 3.72% 
College 24.19% 15.75% 31.18% 22.15% 
Qualification Level     
Top Executives 8.09% 6.51% 14.68% 8.46% 
Intermediary executives 12.41% 9.77% 11.69% 11.35% 
Supervisors 3.12% 2.33% 2.83% 2.79% 
Highly skilled workers 67.13% 69.85% 59.01% 66.95% 
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 4.42% 3.79% 7.42% 4.62% 
Apprentices 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.03% 
Observations 372 189 269 197 106 525 747 921 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007 
Note: Statistics are reported according to the categorization of banks in terms of participation or not in M&A processes for the entire 
period (1993-2007) and do not rely on the year of acquisition. 
 
Table 5 computes some statistics for three levels of a worker’s qualification: “high” (top and 
intermediary executives), “medium” (supervisors and highly skilled and skilled professionals), and 
“low” (semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and apprentices) for merging and non-merging firms. We 
observe that non-merging firms pay more, particularly to “high” and “medium” qualification levels, 
they have a younger workforce and a shorter employment relation through time with their employees. 
Comparing acquirer to acquired firms, acquirer firms, in general, pay more. However, workers of 
acquired banks with low qualifications are worst remunerated than their counterparts in the acquirer 
firms. 
 
  
 
16 
Table 5: Sample means, by qualification levels (workers from acquirers, acquired and non-merging firms) 
Variable 
M&A Not M&A 
 
All 
Acquirer Acquired 
QUAL-L QUAL-M QUAL-H QUAL-L QUAL-M QUAL-H QUAL-L QUAL-M QUAL-H QUAL-L QUAL-M QUAL-H 
Monthly wage (real)             
Mean (euro) 591.6 756.7 1242.6 409.1 696.8 1135.1 612.6 746.4 1489.5 543.0 733.1 1257.6 
Std. Dev. 175.8 201.9 614.3 175.5 168.9 520.6 291.4 341.3 1158.1 225.8 215.7 737.1 
Total compensation (real)             
Mean (euro) 808.5 1093.6 1996.5 581.1 1004.5 1944.4 859.3 1047.0 2199.9 753.6 1054.5 2019.6 
Std. Dev. 314.8 384.6 1567.9 287.2 454.9 1074.8 419.0 560.1 2331.3 353.3 438.8 1626.3 
Schooling (years)             
Mean 9.1 12.1 13.5 5.1 10.8 12.6 9.8 13 14.0 8.1 11.7 13.3 
Std. Dev. 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.3 
Age             
Mean 42.5 38.5 43.4 46.6 41.2 45.7 38.5 34.5 40.7 42.8 39.0 43.5 
Std. Dev. 9.8 9.6 8.2 8.5 9.8 9.0 11.0 8.5 8.8 10.1 9.8 8.7 
Tenure (years)             
Mean 15.2 11.8 14.0 16.3 15.1 17.2 11.0 7.6 9.6 14.6 12.5 14.1 
Std. Dev. 8.5 9.0 9.1 6.1 9.2 10.6 9.2 7.5 8.8 8.3 9.2 9.8 
Observations 16 449 261 469 76 300 10 193 194 321 43 826 8 101 65 877 28 081 34 733 521 669 148 211 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007 
Notes: (1) Monthly wage corresponds to base salary and it is measured in real terms (base year = 1993); Total compensation is measured as the monthly wage plus other remunerations received on a 
regular and irregular basis, in real terms (base year = 1993). (2) Qualifications levels: QUAL-L: Semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and apprentices; QUAL-M: Supervisors and highly skilled and skilled 
professionals; QUAL-H: Top executives and intermediary executives. (3) Statistics are reported according to the categorization of banks in terms of participation or not in M&A processes for the entire 
period (1993-2007) and do not rely on the year of acquisition. 
 
 
 
 17 
If we consider different types of acquisitions, Table 6 presents the sample means for domestic 
and foreign acquisitions. We observe that firms that were engaged in foreign acquisitions present a 
higher compensation level. We also note that workers from foreign acquisitions are younger, more 
educated and register a shorter relation with their employer in terms of tenure. 
Table 6: Sample means, by type of acquisition 
Variable Domestic Foreign 
Number of establishments   
Mean 184.4 118.5 
Std. Dev. 125.3 110.2 
Firm employees   
Mean 2903.0 1528 
Std. Dev. 1939.0 1534 
Monthly wage (real)   
Mean (euro) 759.6 840.9 
Std. Dev. 59.34 153.0 
Total compensation (real)   
Mean (euro) 1142 1320.0 
Std. Dev. 137.4 211.7 
Schooling (years)   
Mean 11.5 12.4 
Std. Dev. 1.4 1.2 
Age   
Mean 40.3 37.6 
Std. Dev. 5.6 3.2 
Tenure (years)   
Mean 12.9 9.8 
Std. Dev. 6.8 5.2 
Observations 188 774 78 383 
Number of banks 10 5 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007 
Notes: (1) Monthly wage corresponds to base salary and it is measured in real terms (base year = 
1993); Total compensation is measured as the monthly wage plus other remunerations received on 
a regular and irregular basis, in real terms (base year = 1993). (2) “Domestic” refers to a domestic 
acquisition; “Foreign” refers to a foreign acquisition – domestic bank acquired by a foreign bank or 
foreign bank acquired by another foreign bank. (3) Statistics are reported according to the 
participation of banks in M&A processes for the entire period (1993-2007) and do not rely on the 
year of acquisition. 
 
 
Table 7 presents summary statistics for variables relating to size and compensation for acquired 
firms in the years before and following the acquisition. We observe that after the acquisition they 
increase in dimension, something that is expected considering that M&A constitutes an alternative to 
internal growth. In terms of compensation, we observe that while monthly wages tend to decrease, 
the total compensation presents a slight increase. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for acquired firms 
Variable T= –1 T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3 
Number of establishments      
Mean 119.79 124.27 148.33 239.86 263.00 
Std. Dev. 110.02 102.75 73.21 119.65 145.82 
Firm employees      
Mean 1788.64 1810.27 2330.83 2955.14 2818 
Std. Dev. 1733.41 1642.87 1584.90 1916.14 1944.89 
Monthly wage (real)      
Mean (euro) 795.18 804.96 806.63 771.01 776.92 
Std. Dev. 149.55 198.61 68.90 51.48 57.10 
Total compensation (real)      
Mean (euro) 1173.93 1215.82 1189.50 1179.44 1244.08 
Std. Dev. 237.95 263.83 151.99 111.44 213.25 
Observations 24 551 26 664 13 787 20 094 19 347 
Banks 14 15 6 7 7 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: Monthly wage corresponds to base salary and it is measured in real terms (base year = 1993); Total 
compensation is measured as the monthly wage plus other remunerations received on a regular and irregular basis, 
in real terms (base year = 1993) and do not rely on the year of acquisition. 
4. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical analysis follows the literature on employment effects of M&A. As pointed out by 
Oberhofer (2013), the impacts of M&A on wages and employment are modelled as a function of some 
explanatory variables for firms and individuals and a dummy variable that captures whether a firm or 
an individual experienced an ownership change. In our case, we have added to the wage equation 
worker and bank fixed effects. 
To analyse the impact of M&A on wages we estimate the following model: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛽1 +  𝒁𝑗𝑡𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                     (1) 
where wijt represents the logarithm of the real total wage of worker i in year t. Total wages are 
computed as the monthly wage plus other payments received on a regular and irregular basis in real 
terms (1993 prices), using the Consumer Price Index from the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). 
 is a vector of a worker’s observable characteristics which include gender, years of schooling, tenure 
and experience and their squares.  
Z is a vector of firm characteristics which refers to firm size, which we proxy by the logarithm of 
the number of workers. We may expect larger firms to pay more (Oi and Idson, 1999a; Oi and Idson, 
1999b; Brown and Medoff, 1989) as workers are more productive in larger firms or, according to 
other theoretical explanations, larger firms are able to pay higher wages or hire higher quality workers. 
 19 
Mit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A in year t and is equal to 
0 if the worker did not participate in a M&A operation. The individual firm and time effects are captured 
by αi, γj and μt, respectively, and εijt is the error term.  
We first examine the impact of M&A on wages and then proceed to analyse the impact of M&A 
on workers of acquired firms that represents our treated group. In order to do that, we define 𝐴𝑖𝑡 as 
a dummy variable equal to one if the worker was employed in an acquired firm (after the M&A) and 
value zero if the worker was in a period before the M&A or not subject to M&A. This variable is the 
main variable of interest as it allows us to assess the effect of average treatment (acquisition). 
We depart from a simplest specification using a pooled data model assuming that all coefficients 
are constant across time and units and that the error term captures the remaining differences between 
them, however, in this model the unobserved individual and firm heterogeneities are captured by the 
error term, which may imply a correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables.  
The fixed effects model allows for the control of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities that 
may be correlated with the explanatory variable 𝐴𝑖𝑡, therefore, we can avoid the omitted variable bias. 
The unobserved individual characteristics may be related with the workers’ skills or abilities and affects 
their wages in the same way, no matter the firm where they are employed; the unobserved firm effects 
may reflect the firm’s wage policy or management policies and capture the characteristics of the firm, 
which similarly affects its workers. The inclusion of time effects control for macroeconomic shocks 
that affect all the firms and their workers in the same way. 
In our model there are three fixed effects: worker fixed effect αi, firm fixed effect γj and year fixed 
effect μt. According to Cornelissen (2006, 2008) the model can be estimated by including one of the 
effects (the firm effect) as dummy variables, and removing the other effect (the worker effect) using 
the within transformation or the fixed effects transformation. The third effect (time effect) does not 
represent a major concern so it can also be incorporated as dummy variables. This method is 
equivalent to “fixed effects least squares dummy variables regression” (FEiLSDVj) proposed by 
Andrews et al. (2006), which combines the classical fixed effects (FE) model and the least squares 
dummy variable model (LSDV) as it sweeps out one effect by the fixed effects transformation and 
includes the other effect as dummy variables. 
If we are not interested in estimating the unobserved effects of workers and firms, we can consider 
the combined individual and firm fixed effects and follow the spell fixed effects method, or FE(s), 
presented in Andrews et al. (2006) and adopted by Graham et al. (2012) in their study about the 
impact of managerial attributes on executive compensation, where they investigate the role of firm 
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and manager unobservable characteristics. This method creates a dummy variable, 𝑉𝑠 , that 
represents a “spell” and it is a unique individual-firm combination, so it is possible to obtain consistent 
estimates of the parameters by time-demeaning within each spell.  Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛽1 +  𝒁𝑗𝑡𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝑉𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                    (2) 
The model is thus reduced to a two-way fixed effects model and it can be estimated by standard 
fixed effects approaches, as the within-group fixed effects and the least squares dummy variable 
approach (Graham et al., 2012)1. Notwithstanding that, this approach allows for the control of the 
influence of individual and firm effects, it is not possible to separate individual from firm effects. 
In order to assess the wage impact differentials by different types of workers, we have included 
in our baseline equation, several interactions terms between the variable 𝐴𝑖𝑡  and the worker 
qualification level (high, medium and low), 𝑄𝑖𝑡. The interaction between these two variables, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑄𝑖𝑡, 
will capture the impact of M&A on individual wages for different qualification levels  
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛽1 +  𝒁𝑗𝑡𝛽2+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽4𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=1 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑄𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡              (3) 
We also decompose the M&A wage impact differential between several types of acquisitions – 
domestic and foreign – and consider the following wage equation, 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝒁𝑗𝑡𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡          (4) 
in which all the notation has the same meaning as in equations (1) and (2), 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a 
dummy variable taking value one if the worker takes part of a domestic acquisition and is at the firm 
after the M&A ( 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1) and 0 if the worker is observed in a period before the 
M&A (𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0); 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable if the worker takes part of a foreign acquisition 
and is at the firm after the M&A (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1) and 0 if the worker is observed in a period before 
the M&A (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This method is presented by Abowd et al. (1999) as the consistent method. 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Wages in acquired banks 
Not only do the results vary according to the specification adopted, but also according to the level of 
unobserved heterogeneity that is considered. In the following analysis, we will mainly explore the 
results obtained from the fixed effects and the spell specifications.  
We observe from Table 8 that larger firms pay more and that more educated and more 
experienced workers have higher wages. These results present the expected effects as suggested by 
the positive sign for education, on average workers who increase their education through labour 
working age, each additional year of education increases wages by 1%. Regarding experience, a non-
linear impact on wages is observed, suggesting decreasing marginal returns.  
Table 8: Impact of M&A on wages 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of the real total wage 
Variable OLS-1 OLS-2 OLS-3 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 
M&A -.090*** 
(.002) 
-.066*** 
(.002) 
-.162*** 
(.006) 
.057*** 
(.001) 
.021*** 
(.003) 
.035*** 
(.005) 
Number of workers (log) -.026*** 
(.001) 
-.027*** 
(.001) 
-.077*** 
(.003) 
-.010*** 
(.001) 
.027*** 
(.001) 
.027*** 
(.002) 
Male .137*** 
(.002) 
.143*** 
(.002) 
.150*** 
(.002) 
-- -- -- 
Education (years) .080*** 
(.0005) 
.077*** 
(.0005) 
.076*** 
(.0005) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.010*** 
(.001) 
Tenure (years) -.015*** 
(.0004) 
-.014*** 
(.0004) 
-.014*** 
(.0005) 
-.007*** 
(.0002) 
-.007*** 
(.0002) 
-.004*** 
(.0003) 
Tenure2 .0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0001*** 
(.0000) 
.0001*** 
(.0000) 
.00002*** 
(.0000) 
Experience (years) .055*** 
(.0004) 
.054*** 
(.0004) 
.053*** 
(.0004) 
.027*** 
(.001) 
.025*** 
(.001) 
.020*** 
(.001) 
Experience2/100 -.067*** 
(.001) 
-.068*** 
(.001) 
-.067*** 
(.001) 
-.041*** 
(.0004) 
-.035*** 
(.0004) 
-.030*** 
(.001) 
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 
Groups    117 580 117 580 150 695 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: (1) M&A is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A and 0 if the worker did not 
participate in a M&A operation. (2) FE-3 is a spell fixed effects regression, including both individual and firm effects. 
(4) Robust standard errors in brackets. (5) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Controlling for worker and firm observable characteristics and analysing the impact of M&A on 
wages, the pooled data model presents a wage decrease of 9%, but when considering time and firm 
effects the negative wage impact of M&A increases to nearly -16%. The estimation with worker fixed 
effects suggests a positive effect on wages, but when we control for both unobserved individual and 
firm level differences, we find a less but still positive wage effect of 2% and 4%. These results 
correspond to the fixed effects method and to the spell method, respectively. 
Assuming that some type of endogeneity may be a possible explanation for the signal change in 
our previous results, we may reformulate our analysis and treat that endogeneity as a case of omitted 
variables. For instance, one could argue that a worker’s ability is an omitted variable, then  
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀&𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀                               (5) 
and also, 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑀&𝐴 + 𝜀,    with ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 < 0                         (6) 
If 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is unobserved, then the formula for omitted variable bias in linear regression is: 
plim ?̂?1𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑀&𝐴)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑀&𝐴)
                              (7) 
Therefore, the bias is proportional to the correlation of 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝑀&𝐴 and to the effect of 
𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (the omitted variable) on 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒. Taking the predicted fixed effect from the fixed effects and 
spell specifications, we observe a negative correlation between the fixed effects and M&A (-0.0996 
and -0.3453, respectively). 
This result signals an interesting finding, in a way, we may relate the fixed effects with the 
propensity to be acquired, as banks with lower worker fixed effects are more prone to be acquired in 
a M&A. Thus, it may be the case that for banks with workers that are not as productive as identical 
workers from other banks, present conditions that make them more susceptible to take part of a 
restructuring process.  
When analysing the effects of M&A on wages after the M&A, we observe from Table 9, and 
controlling for worker and firm characteristics, that the pooled data model presents a wage decrease 
of about 9.5%, but when considering time and firm effects negative effect of M&A on wages is 
approximately 1.6%. Controlling for both unobserved individual and firm level differences, the results 
suggest a positive effects on wages of almost 4%. For workers of acquired banks it is important to note 
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that the variable  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 suggest negative effect, thus reflecting that in spite of the positive effect that 
can be expected from a M&A, this effect will depend on the type of workers. In this case, for workers 
of acquired banks the positive impact will be lower.  We observe also that workers with more years of 
schooling and experience earn more and that firm size has a positive effect on wage for workers 
employed in acquired firms. 
Considering that the effect of M&A may not occur immediately, we estimate the impact in the 
following years after the integration. In fact it is observed that the M&A has a truly positive effect for 
the first year after the acquisition, which means that workers observe an increase in wages of nearly 
4% and 5%, depending on the fixed effects (FE-4) or spell specification (FE-5).  
Notwithstanding the positive effect in the first year of the acquisition, we observe that for the 
subsequent years this positive effect is reduced and this reduction is more pronounced in the third 
year after the M&A. For workers of acquired banks it is observed that, in the third year after the 
acquisition, the positive effect is only 0.3% and 1.9% for the fixed effects or spell specification (FE-5), 
respectively. This result may suggest that a time dimension is important, as pointed out by Huttunen 
(2007), when she considers that there are adjustment costs that must be considered and that are 
related to hiring and firing workers and for this reason the effect on wages is not immediate. Figure 1 
depicts a clear picture of the effects of M&A over time. 
If we consider that inefficient banks are more prone to be acquired, the apparent increase in 
wages is reduced over time after the acquisition, signalling the effects of a restructuring process that 
occurs gradually. 
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Table 9: Impact of M&A on wages 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of the real total wage 
Variable OLS-1 OLS-2 OLS-3 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 
After .013*** 
(.002) 
-.015*** 
(.002) 
-.014*** 
(.002) 
-.014*** 
(.001) 
-.009*** 
(.001) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
-- -- 
M&A  -.095*** 
(.002) 
-.059*** 
(.003) 
-.158*** 
(.006) 
.066*** 
(.001) 
.024*** 
(.001) 
.038*** 
(.005) 
.028*** 
(.005) 
.042*** 
(.005) 
Number of workers (log) -.027*** 
(.001) 
-.027*** 
(.001) 
-.077*** 
(.003) 
-.009*** 
(.001) 
.026*** 
(.001) 
.027*** 
(.002) 
.026*** 
(.002) 
.027*** 
(.002) 
Male .137*** 
(.002) 
.143*** 
(.002) 
.150*** 
(.002) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
Education (years) .079*** 
(.0005) 
.077*** 
(.0005) 
.076*** 
(.0004) 
.015*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.010*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(.001) 
.010*** 
(.001) 
Tenure (years) -.015*** 
(.0004) 
-.014*** 
(.0004) 
-.014*** 
(.0004) 
-.008*** 
(.0002) 
-.007*** 
(.0002) 
-.004*** 
(.0003) 
-.007*** 
(.0003) 
-.004*** 
(.0003) 
Tenure2 .0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0004*** 
(.0000) 
.0001*** 
(.0000) 
.0001*** 
(.0000) 
.00002*** 
(.0000) 
.0001*** 
(.0000) 
.00002*** 
(.0000) 
Experience (years) .055*** 
(.0004) 
.054*** 
(.0004) 
.053*** 
(.0004) 
.027*** 
(.001) 
.025*** 
(.001) 
.020*** 
(.001) 
.025*** 
(.001) 
.020*** 
(.001) 
         
Effect at t=1       .012*** 
(.002) 
.010*** 
(.002) 
Effect at t=2        -.015*** 
(.002) 
-.015*** 
(.002) 
Effect at t=3       -.025*** 
(.002) 
-.023*** 
(.002) 
Effect at t=4       -.010*** 
(.002) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 741 408 
Groups    117 580 117 580 150 695 117 580 150 695 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: (1) M&A is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A  and  0  if the worker did not participate  in  a  M&A operation.  
(2) After is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the worker was employed in an acquired firm (after the M&A) and value zero if the worker was in a 
period before the M&A or not subject to M&A. (3) FE-4 and FE-5 assess the impact of M&A on wages at time t=1, t=2, t=3 and t=4 (one, two, three 
and four years after the M&A, respectively). (4) FE-3 and FE-5 are spell fixed effects regressions including both individual and firm effects). (5) Robust 
standard errors in brackets.  (6) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Effects of M&A over time 
 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: (1) Effects of M&A on wages at time t=1, t=2, t=3 and t=4 (one, two, three and four years after the M&A, 
respectively). (2) Coefficients from FE-4 (Table 9) and significant at 1% level. 
 
5.2. Wage impact comparison between high-medium-low qualified workers 
As was previously mentioned, M&A can be used to break implicit contracts with employees at the 
acquired firm, laying off workers or reducing their wages. However, it may be the case that this 
mechanism, or even the effects of these processes, may not be the same depending on the type 
of workers under consideration.  
In this section, we assess the wage impacts of M&A by qualification levels. We consider three 
levels of a worker’s qualification: “high” (top and intermediary executives), “medium” (supervisors 
and highly skilled and skilled professionals) and “low” (semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and 
apprentices) for merging and non-merging firms.  
The analysis of M&A effects on wages for different levels of qualifications presents different 
conclusions. According to Table 10, for workers of acquired banks, we can expect a reduction of 
the positive effect for almost all levels of qualification. The only exception is observed in our fixed 
effects specification, for those with high qualifications (top and intermediary executives), however, 
a slightly increase of the positive effect of near 0.6.  
It seems that the M&A processes are less favourable for workers of acquired banks, especially 
for lower levels of qualification, however, they have a slightly positive effect on highly qualified 
workers, who may earn more when participating in M&A. 
0%
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In this analysis, we have excluded from the sample those individuals whose information 
regarding qualification was not available. As a robustness check, we estimate the same regressions 
including those individuals and considering their qualification as “non-defined”, as reported by 
Quadros de Pessoal. The results are presented in Table A.3. from Appendix. 
Table 10: Wage impacts of M&A on workers of acquired banks 
 (by qualification levels) 
 FE estimation Spell estimation 
M&A .027*** 
(.005) 
.040*** 
(.005) 
QUAL-L -.029*** 
(.005) 
-.016*** 
(.005) 
QUAL-M -.012*** 
(.002) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
QUAL-H .006** 
(.003) 
-.017*** 
(.003) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Observations 699266 699266 
Groups 115576 146628 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: (1) M&A is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A and 
0 if the worker did not participate in a M&A operation. (2) Qualifications levels: QUAL-L: 
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and apprentices; QUAL-M: Supervisors and highly 
skilled and skilled professionals; QUAL-H: Top executives and intermediary executives. 
(3) Individuals regarding whom information about qualification is not available were 
excluded. (4)*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
5.3. Wage impact comparison between domestic and foreign M&A 
In order to decompose the M&A effect according to the type of acquisition – domestic or foreign – 
we observe from Table 11 that the type of acquisition seems to influence the wage impact 
differentials. For workers of acquired banks, domestic acquisitions tend to have a positive effect on 
wages of 5.9% and 8%, according to the fixed effects and spell specification, respectively.  When 
analysing the impact for workers that participate in foreign acquisitions, we observe a negative 
effect of these processes on wages as workers of acquired banks observe a decrease in the 
expected positive effect of a M&A of almost 5.1 and 5.6 percentage points, according to the fixed 
effects and spell specification, respectively.   
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Table 11: Wage impacts of M&A on workers of acquired banks  
(domestic and foreign acquisitions) 
 FE estimation Spell estimation 
M&A .038*** 
(.005) 
.055*** 
(.005) 
Domestic .021*** 
(.001) 
.025*** 
(.002) 
Foreign -.051*** 
(.003) 
-.056*** 
(.003) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Observations 741408 741408 
Groups 117580 150695 
Source: computations from the author based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1993 – 2007. 
Notes: (1) M&A is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A and 
0 if the worker did not participate in a M&A operation. (2) To classify a bank as a foreign 
entity we consider in our analysis a 50% threshold of foreign participation. (3) *significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
The type of acquisition seems to influence the wage impact differentials. Domestic acquisitions 
tend to have a positive effect on wages. In the case of foreign acquisitions, we observe a negative 
effect on a worker’s wages.  These negative effects are in line with those obtained by Heyman et 
al. (2007) in their fixed effects estimations for Swedish firms, which suggest a negative impact 
from foreign acquisitions. Notwithstanding the recognition of a foreign wage premium, the analysis 
at the individual level does not support the existence of a wage increase. Therefore, it may be the 
case that the individual analysis does not overstate the foreign wage premium. Similar conclusions 
are obtained by Martins (2004) and Martins and Esteves (2008) who find that foreign acquisitions 
have no positive effect on wages or do not have a significant effect on wages. 
6. Discussion and Final Remarks 
This paper investigates the impact of M&A on the wages of workers from acquired firms during the 
1993-2007 period. We have provided new evidence on the impact of these operations on wages 
by using detailed Portuguese data from Quadros de Pessoal. 
We depart from a simplest specification that establishes a relationship between pay and some 
determinants that have been recognized as important in determining wage levels. The 
heterogeneities among individuals and firms could result from differences in workers’ skills or 
abilities and in the firm’s wage policy or management policies, so it is important to account for 
these unobserved characteristics. We observe that the inclusion of these individual and firm 
characteristics alters the magnitude of other explanatory variables.  
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The results suggest a positive effect of M&A on wages; however, for workers that have 
participated in M&A, after the operation, and that have been acquired it seems that M&A has a 
detrimental effect on wages. The inclusion of firm dummies in the fixed effects and spell 
specifications may pick up a variety of effects, such as organizational effects or management 
practices that may influence wages. Moreover, the inclusion of firm and worker effects, as well as 
the combination of these two effects, does not separately identify firm and individual effects and 
we cannot isolate them. To separate these effects, it is important to restrict our sample to a panel 
of workers that move between firms. Abowd et al. (2002) identify these effects using the fixed 
effects approach, creating groups of connected workers and firms. 
As Ferreira (2009) points out, the within-groups fixed effects approach permits the elimination 
of the unobserved worker, firm and match heterogeneity. However, the impossibility to separately 
identify all the time-invariant unobserved effects constitutes a limitation, as the mobility of workers 
could happen non-randomly. This may explain the difference in wage effects, as the job mobility 
may be related to the match between workers and firms, thus a good match would be positively 
reflected on wages. In this case, successful matches could lead to increased earnings, while bad 
matches could lead to a decrease in earnings or even to a worker’s dismissal. 
Controlling for both unobserved individual and firm level differences, the results suggest a 
positive effect of M&A on wages of almost 4%. Positive wage effects for workers of acquired banks 
is in accordance with the results obtained by Conyon et al. (2004), McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), 
Kubo and Saito (2012) as well as Amess et al. (2014), who observe a wage increase that can be 
explained by labour efficiency gains. For workers of acquired banks, after the M&A, the results 
suggest that the wage premium related to a M&A is not so manifest as the positive impact will be 
lower.  We observe also that workers with more years of schooling and experience earn more and 
that firm size has a positive effect on wage for workers employed in acquired firms. 
The inclusion of the time dimension seems to be important. We observe a positive effect of 
M&A for workers of acquired banks in the first year of the acquisition. However, we observe also 
that for the subsequent years this positive effect is reduced and this reduction is more pronounced 
in the third year after the M&A. For workers of acquired banks it is observed that, in the third year 
after the acquisition, the positive effect is only 0.3% and 1.9% for the fixed effects or spell 
specification (FE-5), respectively.  
This may reflect an adjustment process related to the M&A, thus, in spite of the expected 
positive effect of M&A on wages, when we observe workers that were subject to an acquisition 
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process in the following years after the operation, the expected M&A wage premium disappears, 
thus validating the hypothesis that M&A serve as a mechanism of restructuring. If banks that are 
less efficient tend to be acquired, the apparent increase in wages is reduced over time after the 
acquisition, signalling the effects of a restructuring process that occurs gradually. 
The positive relationship between pay and size is well demonstrated by our results, which 
suggest that larger firms pay more. Education and experience are also important in determining 
wages. The analysis of the M&A wage effects on different levels of qualification, lead us to conclude 
that the effects differ. For workers that have been acquired the positive effects are not so large as 
the acquisition itself reduces the expected positive effect on wages, however for highly qualified 
workers, using our fixed effects specification, we observe an incremental positive effect on wages. 
Thus, as Siegel et al. (2009) suggest, there is a positive relation between earnings and the quality 
of human capital, namely in what concerns experience and the percentage of workers with high 
qualifications. Therefore, we may expect that M&A promote a quality improvement of human capital 
or it may be the case that there is a wage premium for highly skilled workers. 
Considering that M&A may constitute a mechanism of restructuring, especially for inefficient 
banks, the effects of M&A may differ according to the type of workers, thus, in line with Smeets et 
al. (2016), the restructuring process may be negatively reflected on workers with less firm-specific 
human capital and be positive for highly skilled workers. 
We also find that M&A may produce different effects on employees’ wages according to the 
type of operation we are analysing. Domestic acquisitions tend to have a positive effect on wages, 
but when analysing the impact for workers of foreign acquisitions, the results do not support the 
existence of a foreign wage premium.  
There are some questions that deserve further development. First, it may be important to 
assess, in more detail, the effects of acquisitions on highly skilled workers for whom we have 
obtained a positive effect in comparison to other levels. In doing so, it may also be interesting to 
try to assess the employment effects, in terms of mobility, for this type of workers.  
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Appendix 
A.1. The “Quadros de Pessoal” and “Associação Portuguesa de Bancos” Datasets 
This appendix describes the data sources used in this paper and the methodology used for the 
construction of the dataset. 
Quadros de Pessoal, is an annual mandatory survey conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of 
Labour, Solidarity and Social Security since 1982 which gathers information on all firms located in 
Portugal with wage-earners.  Its mandatory nature, as well as the fact that the information is 
provided by the employer and is made available to every worker in a public space of the 
establishment, reduces measurement errors and contributes to the reliability of the data.  
This longitudinal database provides information at the firm (such as location, industry, sales, 
legal setting, year of constitution, share of the firm’s equity owned by foreign parties, number of 
establishments and number of employees) and at the establishment level (such as location, 
industry and number of workers, among others). The set of workers characteristics includes age, 
education, tenure, wages and hours worked.  
In our analysis, we use information for the 1985 to 2007 period with the exception of 1990 
and 2001, because data was not collected in those years. The dataset is restricted to 2007 as the 
Financial Crisis took place in 2008. The existence of unique (time-invariant) identifiers allows for 
matching firms and workers in each year and for following them over time. The dataset contains 
information on the industry in which firms operate and on a worker’s occupation, so it is possible 
to identify the banking entities and the workers of those firms. 
The entities in our sample were restricted to those operating on “other monetary 
intermediation” (code 65120), according to the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities – 
CAE–rev 2.1 (1995 version) and they include all monetary institutions, excluding the Central Bank. 
Three revisions of CAE have occurred between 1985 and 2007. The methodology for CAE 
uniformization and the entities included in “other monetary intermediation” is described as follows: 
According to the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) the category “other monetary 
intermediation” refers to those institutions that are principally engaged in receiving deposits and/or 
close substitutes for deposits and, on their own account, in granting loans and/or investing in 
securities. This group in Portugal is made up of the Bank of Portugal, all other banks, savings banks 
and agricultural mutual credit funds (including the central mutual agricultural fund). 
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Table A.1.1: CAE 651 rev.2 (Monetary Intermediation, excluding Central Bank) 
Code Descriptive 
6512 Other Monetary Intermediation: 
 65121  Banking Institutions 
 65122  Savings Banks 
 65123  Agricultural Mutual Credit Funds 
 65124  Other Monetary Intermediation 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 
 
 
In the period under analysis there were three revisions in CAE (from CAE–rev.1 to CAE–rev.2 
and to CAE–rev.2.1 1 and then to CAE–rev.3), thus the dataset was manipulated in order to 
transform the classification under CAE–rev.1 on the 2007 classification – CAE–rev.3 –, which 
requires the use of correspondence tables. These tables catalogue the CAE codes and their 
equivalent on the new categorization and they were obtained from INE and. Table A.1.2 presents 
the transformations occurred since CAE–rev.1 to CAE–rev.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The transformations from CAE–rev.2 to CAE–rev.2.1 were not significant in comparison to others. 
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Table A.1.2: Correspondence tables for CAE-rev.2, CAE rev.2.1 and CAE rev.3 
CAE - rev.1 
(original code) 
CAE - rev.2 
(revised code) 
CAE - rev.2 
(original code) 
CAE - rev.2.1 
(revised code) 
CAE - rev.2.1 
(original code) 
CAE - rev.3 
(revised code) 
8101.1.0 65110 65110 65110 65110 64110 
8101.2.0 65121 65121 65120 65120 64190 
8101.3.0 65121 65122 65120 65210 64910 
8101.4.0 65121 65123 65120 65221 64923 
8102.1.0 65121 65124 65120 65222 64991 
65122 65210 65210 65223 64922 
8102.2.0 65123 65221 65221 65224 64921 
8102.3.0 65124 65222 65222 64923 
8102.4.1 65230 65223 65223 65230 64201 
8102.4.9 65210 65224 65224 64300 
65222 65230 65230 64992 
65223     
65224     
65230     
8102.5.0 65230     
8102.6.0 65221     
65224     
65230     
8102.9.0 65124     
65224     
65230     
8103.1.0 67110     
67120     
67130     
8103.2.0 67130     
8103.3.0 67130     
8103.9.0 67130     
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 
Note: Adapted from INE’s Tabelas de Correspondência restricted to “Financial Intermediation” (code 65), according to the two 
digits sector classification of the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities - CAE (1995 version). 
 
Extensive checks were made to guarantee the correspondence, assuming for those cases 
where the correspondence was not possible and for those where inconsistencies were detected 
that the prevailing classification was that which was reported more frequently. 
In this process, a new variable was first created– caemp_2 – with the purpose of creating a 
unique CAE for all the years under analysis (1985 – 2006), but the inclusion in a later stage of 
2007, forced us to consider the revision operated in that year. According to the new classification, 
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the entities operating in “Financial Intermediation” correspond to code 64 and those classified as 
“other monetary intermediation” are registered as 64190. At this stage, the variable caenew was 
created, which corresponds to the mode of the variable caemp_2. Taking into account that the 
inclusion of 2007 would originate missing values that result from the fact that caemp_2 only exists 
until 2006, the variable caenew was recoded using the classification of rev3 and transforming 
these on the corresponding classification of rev2.1. This procedure was important to continue the 
CAE standardization. Finally, it was possible to create the variable – caenew3 – which originated 
from caenew, but it is defined in terms of the new codes created (CAE–rev.3). As was done before, 
we have used the correspondence tables to guarantee the harmonization of CAE, but for the 
purpose of the analysis and when considering the period 1985 – 2007 we needed to use not just 
the CAE 65120, but also the CAE 64190 (the CAE 65120 is equivalent under rev3 to CAE 64190), 
however, as was previously mentioned, for some entities that just appeared in 2007 we also 
needed to consider this classification. 
After de creation of the main dataset it was important to identify all domestic acquisitions. The 
identification of domestic acquisitions was possible using data collected on an annual basis by the 
Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) in their Boletins Informativos. This dataset contains 
information on all banks in Portugal and reports the transformations occurred in the banking sector. 
Besides accounting information, the dataset reveals information on firms (such as age, ownership, 
size, number of employees and branches and localization) and employees characteristics 
(qualifications, type of activity and occupation in each bank). Another important fact is that, every 
year, the Boletim Informativo presents a synthesis of the evolution in the banking sector in 
comparison to the previous year, mentioning which banks entered or exited in the banking sector 
or which were involved in the process of M&As, so it allows us to find those entities in Quadros de 
Pessoal, by matching some information with that obtained from the APB. We have also identified 
all the entities that were not engaged in those processes. Table 1 highlights the major 
transformations occurred in the banking sector of the banks listed in Boletins Informativos, between 
1993 and 2006. The year 2007 was not considered, since no important transformations were 
reported for our analysis in that year. The remaining banks that were not subject to M&A 
transformations are presented in Appendix A.2 (Table A.2). 
The Boletins Informativos present information on share capital (capital social) as well as 
Quadros de Pessoal, thus it was possible to match the information and identify the entities. 
Notwithstanding that the information provided from the APB is only available since 1993; it was 
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possible to compare the evolution of this variable in Quadros de Pessoal and in the Boletins 
Informativos throughout the period under analysis. The existing information allowed us to identify 
the entities and in those cases where the comparison was uncertain, a third source of information 
was used. The information contained in the “Information Disclosure System” of the Comissão do 
Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) was valuable, since it was possible to find information on 
the registries of the entities and institutions completed since the second quarter of the year 2000. 
In a low number of cases it was necessary to use this source of information. 
A.2. Banks not involved in M&A 
Table A.2: Banks listed in Boletins Informativos (APB) that were not engaged in M&A 
Credit institution 
ABN AMRO, Bank N.V. (sucursal) * 
Banco Invest, S.A. (previous Banco Alves Ribeiro, S.A.) 
Banco de Negócios Argentaria * 
Banco Espírito Santo dos Açores, S.A. 
Banco Africano de Investimentos, S.A.R.L (Sucursal) * 
Banco Mais, S.A. 
Banif – Banco de Investimento, S.A. * 
Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A. 
Barclays Bank PLC (Sucursal) 
Banco do Brasil, S.A. 
Banco Comercial dos Açores, S.A. 
Banco Espírito Santo de Investimento, S.A. (previous Banco ESSI) 
BEST – Banco Electrónico de Serviço Total, S.A. 
Banco de Investimento Global, S.A. 
Banco de Investimento Imobiliário 
Banco Nacional de Investimento, S.A.* 
Banque Nationale de Paris (Sucursal) * 
BANKBOSTON Latinoamericano S.A. 
Banco Português de Gestão, S.A. 
Banco Português de Negócios – SGPS, S.A. 
Banco Privado Português* 
Banco Santander de Negócios Portugal, S.A. 
Caixa Galicia – Caja de Ahorros de Galícia (Sucursal) * 
Caixa Vigo – Caixa de Aforros de Vigo, Ourense e Pontevedra (Sucursal) * 
The Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi, Ltd (Sucursal) * 
Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo * 
Central – Banco de Investimento, S.A.* 
Banco Cetelem, S.A. * 
Caixa – Banco de Investimento, S.A. (previous Banco Chemical Finance, S.A. and Banco Totta e Sottomayor de 
Investimento, S.A.) 
BCP Investimento – Banco Comercial Português de Investimento (previous CISF – Banco de Investimento and 
BCPA – Banco de Investimento, S.A.) 
Citibank Portugal, S.A. 
Credifin – Banco de Crédito ao Consumo, S.A.* 
Continued on next page 
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Table A.2. – continued from previous page 
Deutsche Bank (Portugal), S.A. 
Banco Efisa, S.A. 
Banco Finantia, S.A.* 
Finibanco, S.A. 
Fortis Bank – sucursal (previous Generale Bank – sucursal) 
SanPaolo IMI BANK (Internacional), S.A.* 
Interbanco, S.A. 
Banco Itaú Europa, S.A. 
Banco Madesant Sociedade Unipessoal, S.A.* 
Banco ACTIVOBANK (Portugal), S.A. (previous Banco Mello de Investimentos, S.A.) 
Banco Central Hispano Portugal, S.A. * 
Caixa Económica – Montepio Geral 
Banco Rural Europa, S.A. 
Banco Sabadell, S.A.* 
Source: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. 
Note: * These banks could not be found in Quadros de Pessoal, so it was not possible to proceed with the match process.  
 
A.3. Wage impact of M&A (by qualification levels) – Estimation results for the sample, 
including individuals with a “Non-defined” level of qualification  
 
Table A.3: Wage impact of M&A (by qualification levels) 
 FE estimation Spell estimation 
M&A .026*** 
(.002) 
.040*** 
(.005) 
QUAL-L -.030*** 
(.005) 
-.016*** 
(.005) 
QUAL-M -0.16*** 
(.002) 
-.010*** 
(.002) 
QUAL-H .005* 
(.003) 
-.018*** 
(.003) 
Non-defined .027*** 
(.003) 
.028*** 
(.003) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
Observations 741408 741408 
Groups 117580 150695 
Notes: (1) M&A is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences 
a M&A and 0 if the worker did not participate in a M&A operation. (2) 
Qualifications levels: QUAL-L: Semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and 
apprentices; QUAL-M: Supervisors and highly skilled and skilled 
professionals; QUAL-H: Top executives and intermediary executives.               
(3) Individuals regarding whom information about qualification is not 
available are included. (4)*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1% 
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A.4. Definition of variables 
Table A.4: Definitions of variables in the model 
Variables  Definition 
Real total wage Logarithm of the real total wage, computed as the monthly wage plus other 
payments received on a regular and irregular basis. The real total wage was 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and is expressed in the 
1993 prices. 
After 1 if the worker was employed in an acquired firm (after the M&A), 0 if the 
worker was in a period before the M&A or not subject to the M&A. 
M&A Mit is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker experiences a M&A, 0 if 
the worker did not participate in a M&A operation 
Effect at t=1 1 if one year after M&A, 0 otherwise. 
Effect at t=2 1 if two years after M&A, 0 otherwise. 
Effect at t=3 1 if three years after M&A, 0 otherwise. 
Number of workers Logarithm of total employment. 
Male 1 if male, 0 if female. 
Education Years of schooling 
Education level  
No education 1 if the worker has less than primary school, 0 otherwise. 
Primary education 1 if the worker has primary school, 0 otherwise. 
Preparatory education 1 if the worker has preparatory school, 0 otherwise. 
Lower secondary 1 if the worker has lower secondary school, 0 otherwise. 
Secondary 1 if the worker has secondary school, 0 otherwise. 
Upper secondary 1 if the worker has upper secondary school, 0 otherwise. 
College 1 if the worker has college, 0 otherwise. 
Tenure  The number of years that the worker is employed in the current firm. 
Experience Computed as age minus years of schooling minus six. 
Experience2/100 Quadratic of experience divided by 100. 
 
Qualification level  
Top executive 1 if the worker is a top executive, 0 otherwise. 
Intermediary executive 1 if the worker is an intermediary executive, 0 otherwise. 
Supervisor 1 if the worker is a supervisor, 0 otherwise. 
Highly skilled and skilled 1 if the worker is a highly skilled and skilled professional, 0 otherwise. 
Semi-skilled and unskilled 1 if the worker is a semi-skilled and unskilled professional, 0 otherwise. 
Apprentice 1 if the worker is an apprentice, 0 otherwise. 
Non-defined 1 if the worker has a non-defined qualification, 0 otherwise. 
  
High 1 if top executives and intermediary executives, 0 otherwise. 
Medium 1 if supervisors and highly skilled and skilled professionals, 0 otherwise. 
Low 1 if semi-skilled and unskilled workers and apprentices, 0 otherwise 
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